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Abstract. At PKC 2008, Plantard et al. published a theoretical framework for a lattice-based signature scheme. Recently, after ten years, a new
signature scheme dubbed as the Diagonal Reduction Signature (DRS)
scheme was presented in the NIST PQC Standardization as a concrete
instantiation of the initial work. Unfortunately, the initial submission
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1

Introduction

The popularity of post-quantum cryptography has increased significantly after
the formal announcement by the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) to move away from classical cryptography [18]. This is due to the
potential threat that will be brought by the upcoming large scale quantum computers, which theoretically break the underlying traditional hard problem by
using Shor’s algorithm [25]. There are currently three main families in postquantum cryptology, namely code-based cryptography, multivariate cryptography, and lattice-based cryptography. This work primarily concerns with latticebased cryptography. First introduced by Minkowski in a pioneering work [15]
to solve various number problems, lattices have the advantage to often base
their security on worst-case assumptions [1] rather than the average case, and
to be highly parallelizable and algorithmically simple enough to compete with
traditional schemes in terms of computing speed. Inspired by this, Goldreich,
Goldwasser and Halevi (GGH) [7] proposed an efficient way to use lattices to
build a public-key encryption scheme. Their practical scheme has been broken
using lattice reduction techniques [16], however the central idea remains viable
and it has enabled a wide array of applications and improvements, such as using
tensor products [5], Hermite Normal Forms [14], polynomial representations [19],

rotations [26], and the most popular one being Learning With Errors [23] or its
variants.
More recently, the NIST attempt at standardizing post-quantum cryptography [17] received a lot of interest from the community and the vast majority
of the lattice-based submissions for “Round 1” are actually based on LWE [17].
One of the few lattice-based submissions which is not using LWE or ideal lattices
is the Diagonal Reduction Signature Scheme (DRS) [20], which uses a diagonal
dominant matrix that can be seen as a sum between a diagonal matrix with very
big coefficients and a random matrix with low coefficients. DRS was based on a
paper from PKC 2008 [21] however the original paper had mostly a theoretical
interest and did not provide an explicit way to construct the random matrix
with low values, rather than merely stating conditions on norm bounds it should
respect for the signature scheme to be proven functioning. The NIST submission however provides a more straight-forward way to generate the noise, using
another proof and condition to ensure the functionality of the scheme. This new
way to generate the noise, however, is shown to be insecure: soon after DRS was
made public, Yu and Ducas used machine learning techniques to severely reduce
the security parameters [30]. Although according to Ducas’ comments on the
NIST forum [17], the attack was not devastating as it still seems asymptotically
secure, however its concrete security was significantly decreased. On the same
work, Yu and Ducas also provided several suggestions in order to fix those issues
and one of those comments suggested using a statistical analysis. Another more
recent attack from Li, Liu, Nitaj and Pan [11] on a randomized version of the
initial scheme proposed by Plantard, Susilo and Win [21] can also be indirectly
considered an attack to the DRS scheme, although this attack does not seem as
important as Yu and Ducas’s one.
In the following work, we do follow some of those suggestions and we aim to
provide a new noise generation method to eliminate the aforementioned attack
and restore some of the DRS’ concrete security. We will present some statistical
heuristics and remove some of the structure that allow the initial DRS scheme
to be attacked.
Our Contribution and Paper Organization
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. We first present some relevant
background on lattice theory and re-introduce the DRS scheme from Plantard
et al. Subsequently, we will comment on the attack of Li, Liu, Nitaj and Pan [11]
and explain why it is not applicable. Then we discuss the weakness found by Yu
and Ducas and our idea to correct this. We finally present the detail algorithms
about our security patch and raise some open questions.

2

Background

In this section, we briefly recall the basics of lattice theory.
2.1

Lattice theory

Definition 1 We call lattice a discrete subgroup of Rn where n is a positive
integer. We say a lattice is an integer lattice when it is a subgroup of Zn . A

basis of the lattice is a basis as a Z − module. If M is a matrix, we define L(M )
the lattice generated by the rows of M .
In this work we only consider full-rank integer lattices, i.e., such that their
basis can be represented by a n × n non-singular integer matrix.
Theorem 1 (Determinant) For any lattice L, there exists a real p
value we call
determinant, denoted det(L), such that for any basis B, det(L) = det(BB T ).
The literature sometimes call det(L) as the volume of L [15].
Definition 2 We say a lattice is a diagonally dominant type lattice if it admits
a basis of the form D + R where D = d × Id, d ∈ Z, and R is a “noise” matrix
whose diagonal entries are zeroes and the absolute sum of each entry is lower
than d per each row separately.
We note that the definition is similar to the one which can be found in
fundamental mathematics books [3] for diagonal dominant matrices. We will
just adapt the lattice to its diagonal dominant basis.
Definition 3 (Minima) We note λi (L) the i−th minimum of a lattice L. It is
the radius of the smallest zero-centered ball containing at least i linearly independant elements of L.
(L)
and call that a
Definition 4 (Lattice gap) We note δi (L) the ratio λλi+1
i (L)
lattice gap. When mentioned without index and called “the” gap, the index is
implied to be i = 1.

In practice, only the case i = 1 is used, but other values are sometimes useful
to consider [29]. We also define the “root lattice gap”, i.e., elevated to the power
1
n where n is the dimension of the lattice.
Definition 5 We say a lattice is a diagonally dominant type lattice (of dimension n) if it admits a diagonal dominant matrix as a basis B as in [3], i.e.,
Pn
∀i ∈ [1, n], Bi,i ≥ j=1,i6=j |Bi,j |
We can also see a diagonally dominant matrix B as a sum B = D + R where
D is diagonal and Di,i > kRi k1 . In our scheme, we use a diagonal dominant
lattice as our secret key, and will refer to it as our “reduction matrix” (as we
use this basis to “reduce” our vectors).
Definition 6 Let F be a subfield of C, V a vector space over F k , and p a positive
integer or ∞. We call lp norm over V the norm:
qP
k
– ∀x ∈ V, kxkp = p i=1 |xi |p
– ∀x ∈ V, kxk∞ = maxi∈[1,k] |xi |
l1 and l2 are commonly used and are often called taxicab norm and euclidean
norm, respectively. We note that we also define the maximum matrix norm as
the biggest value among the sums of the absolute values in a single column.
The norm that was used by Plantard et al. for their signature validity is the
maximum norm. However, as far as the security heuristics are concerned the
euclidean norm (l2 ) is used, and as far as the reduction termination proof is
concerned the taxicab norm (l1 ) is used.

2.2

Lattice problems

The most famous problems on lattice are the Shortest Vector Problem (SVP)
and the Closest Vector Problem (CVP). We tend to approximatively solving
CVP by solving heuristically SVP in an expanded lattice [7].
Definition 7 (CVP: Closest Vector Problem) Given a basis B of a lattice
L of dimension n and t ∈ Rn , find v ∈ L such that ∀w ∈ L, kt − vk ≤ kt − wk.
Definition 8 (SVP: Shortest Vector Problem) Given a basis B of a lattice
L of dimension n, find v ∈ L such that ∀w ∈ L, v 6= w, kvk ≤ kw − vk, i.e
kvk = λ1 (B).
In cryptography, we rely on the “easier” versions of those problems:
Definition 9 (uSVPδ : δ-unique Shortest Vector Problem) Given a basis
of a lattice L with its lattice gap δ > 1, solve SVP.
Since λ1 (L) is also hard to determine (it is indeed another lattice problem we
do not state here), measuring the efficiency of an algorithm is another challenge
by itself. Therefore, to measure algorithm efficiency we must be able to define a
problem with easily computable parameters, which is where the Hermite factor
is originated from:
Definition 10 (HSVPγ : γ-Hermite Shortest Vector Problem) Given a basis B of a lattice L of dimension n and a factor γ we call Hermite Factor, find
y ∈ L such that kyk ≤ γdet(L)1/n .
Some cryptosystems are based on worst-case hardness on uSVP with polynomial gap as [2] and [23]. The practical hardness of uSVP depends on its gap
compared to a fraction of the Hermite factor, where the constant in front of the
factor depends of the lattice and the algorithm used [6]. There exists an attack
that was specifically built to exploit high gaps [12].
Definition 11 (BDDγ : γ-Bounded Distance Decoding) Given a basis B
of a lattice L, a point x and a approximation factor γ ensuring d(x, L) < γλ1 (B)
find the lattice vector v ∈ L closest to x.
It has been proved that BDD1/(2γ) reduces itself to uSVPγ in polynomial
time and the same goes from uSVPγ to BDD1/γ when γ is polynomially
bounded by n [13], in cryptography the gap is polynomial the target point x
must be polynomially bounded therefore solving one or the other is relatively
the same in our case. To solve those problems, we usually use an embedding technique that extends a basis matrix by one column and one row vector that are full
of zeroes except for one position where the value is set to 1 at the intersection of
those newly added spaces, and then apply lattice reduction techniques on these.
As far as their signature scheme is concerned, the GDDγ is more relevant:
Definition 12 (GDDγ : γ-Guaranteed Distance Decoding) Given a basis
B of a lattice L, any point x and a approximation factor γ, find v ∈ L such that
kx − vk ≤ γ.

3

The initial DRS scheme and its security pitfall

We will briefly summarize the DRS scheme below, which can be considered
a fork of the theoretical framework of PKC 2008 [21]. The DRS scheme uses
the maximum norm to check if a vector is reduced. To achieve that purpose,
they use a diagonal dominant basis, where every substraction from a diagonally
dominant basis vector reduces a coefficient by a lot more than it potentially adds
to the other coefficients. By repeating those steps for each coefficient, we end
up reducing the vector. The initial DRS scheme requires multiple parameters to
be preset (see the file api.h in their NIST submission), which we give here the
main ones describing their choice for a secret key: D, a big diagonal coefficient,
NB , the number of occurences per vectorof the “big” noise {−B, B}, and is the
lowest positive number such that 2NB Nnb ≥ 2λ , B, the value of the “big” noise,
and is equal to D/(2NB ), and N1 , the number of occurences per vector of the
small noise {−1, 1}, and is equal to D − (NB B) − ∆. As we will see by discussing
previous work, this structure directly impact the security.
3.1

The original DRS scheme

Setup Using the same notation as the report given in [20], we briefly restate
their initial algorithm. Those parameters are chosen such that the secret key
matrix stays diagonal dominant as per the definition written previously. From
our understanding, the large coefficients B were used to increase the euclidean
norm, as an attempt to enhance its security against lattice reduction attacks.
Alg 1 is the original secret key computation.
The public key is obtained by successive additions/substractions of pair of
vectors (see Alg 2). Note that the only difference with the original scheme is that
we do not store the log2 of the maximum norm. We estimate this information
to be easily computed at will.
This is equivalent to a multiplication of random pairs of vectors (a 2 × n
matrix) by a square invertible matrix of dimension 2 and maximum norm of
2. In their case, every vector go through exactly one matrix multiplication per
round, for a total of R rounds where R is defined by the system. The number
of rounds R is decided upon security consideration but also efficiency reasons as
the authors of DRS wanted to fit every computation within 64-bits. For more
details we refer again to [20]. From our understanding, the power of 2 p2 has
no security impact, and is used mostly for the verification process to make sure
intermediate computation results stay within 64-bits. This type of public key
is very different from the Hermite Normal Form proposed in [21], however the
computation time of a Hermite Normal Form is non-negligible. As we will see
later this directly impact the signature.
Signature Given the fact that the secret key is a diagonally dominant matrix,
Alg 3 is guaranteed to complete. The proof can be seen in [20]. Plantard et al.

Input: - all initial parameters;
- another extra random seed x2 ;
Output: - x, S the secret key;
// Initialization
S ← 0;
t ∈ Zn ;
// Algorithm start
InitiateRdmSeed(x2 );
// Set t[1] to D, NB elements to B, N1 to 1, the rest to 0
t ← [D,B, ..., B ,1, ..., 1,0,...,0];
| {z } | {z }
NB

N1

// Randomly permute values of t with a function RdmPmtn
// RdmPmtn leaves t[1] unchanged
t ← RdmPmtn(t);
for i = 1 ; i ≤ n ; i = i + 1 do
S[i][i] ← t[1];
// Apply a circular permutation and randomly flip signs
for j = 2 ; j ≤ n ; j = j + 1 do
S[i][((i + j) mod n) + 1] ← t[j] ∗ RdnSgn();
end
end
return x, S;

Algorithm 1: Secret key generation (square matrix of dimension n)

Input: - S the reduction matrix of dimension n, obtained previously;
- a random seed x;
Output: - P the public key, and p2 a power of two;
// Initialization
P ← S;
// Algorithm start
InitiateRdmSeed(x);
// Apply R rounds
for i = 1 ; i < R ; i = i + 1 do
P ← RdmPmtn(P );
for j = 1 ; j ≤ n − 1 ; j = j + 2 do
t ← RdmSgn();
P [j] = P [j] + t ∗ P [j + 1];
P [j + 1] = P [j + 1] + t ∗ P [j];
end
end
P ← RdmPmtn(P );
return P, p2 ;

Algorithm 2: Public key generation

did not have a second vector k to output in their initial scheme and thus only
had to deal with the reduction part [21].

Input: - A vector v ∈ Zn ;
- S the secret key matrix, with diagonal coefficient d;
- s a seed value;
Output: - w with v ≡ w [L(S)], kwk∞ < d and k with kP = v − w;
// Initialization
w ← v, i ← 0, k ← [0, ..., 0];
// Algorithm start
// Reduce until all coefficients are low enough
while kwk∞ < d do
q ← wdi , ki ← ki + q, w ← w − qS[i], i ← i + 1 mod n;
end
// Use the seed to modify k such that kP = v − w
// The seed defines the output of RdmPmtn and RdmSgn
InitiateRdmSeed(x);
for i = 1 ; i ≤ R ; i = i + 1 do
k ← RdmPmtn(k);
for j = 1 ; j ≤ n − 1 ; j = j + 2 do
t ← RdmSgn();
k[j + 1] = k[j + 1] − t ∗ k[j];
k[j] = k[j] − t ∗ k[j + 1];
end
end
k ← RdmPmtn(k);
return k, v, w;

Algorithm 3: Sign : coefficient reduction first, validity vector then

Verification Alg 4 checks if the vector v is reduced enough i.e kvk∞ < D where
D is the diagonal coefficient of the secret key matrix S. Then it tries to check
the validity of kP = v − w. By using the power p2 , the authors of DRS want
to ensure the computations stay within 64-bits. If multiprecision integers were
used (as GMP), we note it would not take a while loop with multiple rounds to
check. Whether this is more efficient or not remains to be tested.
3.2

Li, Liu, Nitaj and Pan’s attack on a randomized version of the
initial PKC’08

In ACISP 2018, Li, Liu, Nitaj and Pan [11] presented an attack that makes
use of short signatures to recover the secret key. Their observation is that two
different signatures from the same message is also a short vector of the lattice.
Then, gathering sufficient number of short vectors enable easier recovery of the

Input: - A vector v ∈ Zn ;
- P, p2 the public key matrix and the log2 of its maximum norm;
- w the reduced form of v;
- k the extra information vector;
Output: - w a reduced vector, with v ≡ w [L(P )];
// Test for max norm first
if kwk∞ >= D then return FALSE ;
// Loop Initialization
q ← k, t ← v − w;
while q 6= 0 ∧ t 6= 0 do
r ← q mod p2 , t ← rP − t;
// Check correctness
if t 6= 0 mod y then return FALSE ;
t ← t/p2 , q ← (q − r)/p2 ;
if (t = 0) Y (q = 0) then return FALSE ;
end
return TRUE ;

Algorithm 4: Verify

secret key using lattice reduction algorithms with the vectors generated. Their
suggestion to fix this issue is to either store previous signed messages to avoid
having different signatures, or padding a random noise in the hash function. We
should note that the initial DRS scheme is not randomized as the algorithm is
deterministic and produce a unique signature per vector.
We do note that the authors of DRS suggested in their report [20] to use a
random permutation to decide the order of the coefficent reduction, and thus
Li, Liu, Nitaj and Pan’s attack might apply to their suggestion. However, the
order of the coefficient reduction could also be decided deterministically by the
hashed message itself, and therefore, Li, Liu, Nitaj and Pan’s attack is not fully
applicable, as this method would produce an unique signature per message. They
can still generate a set of relatively short vectors (r1 , ..., r2 ) ∈ Ln of the lattice
L, however it is unclear whether the specialized version of their attack using
vectors s,(v1 , ..., vn ) where s − vi ∈ L is still applicable. It seems to be easier
to recover the key when using multiple signatures from the same message as a
lattice basis when using lattice reduction algorithms rather than using random
small vectors of the lattice: this could imply that diagonal dominant basis have
inner weaknesses beyond the simple instantiation of DRS. From our understanding, the secret key matrices they generated for their tests used a noise matrix
with coefficients within {−1, 0, 1}, which could have had an impact in their experimentations. It is still unknown if other noise types such as the ones in DRS
or the type of noise we are about to propose are affected: to the best of our
knowledge, DRS was not quoted in their work.

We stress that we do not claim the new setup to be perfectly secure against
Li, Liu, Nitaj and Pan’s attack, we merely claim more experimentations would
need to be done as of now. Furthermore, the countermeasures proposed by Li,
Liu, Nitaj and Pan also apply to those new keys, and should be applied if one
wishes for a more concrete security. The next attack however does not have clear
known countermeasures as of now and is the main focus of this paper.
3.3

Yu and Ducas’s attack on the DRS instantiation of the initial
scheme of PKC’08

We explained in the previous section about the security of DRS against Li, Liu,
Nitaj and Pan’s attack. On the other hand, it is unclear if such a modification
would add an extra weakness against Yu and Ducas’s heuristic attack. Their
attack work in two steps. The first one is based on recovering certain coefficients
of a secret key vector using machine learning and statistical analysis. The second
is classical lattice-reduction attack to recover the rest of the secret key.
For the first step, Yu and Ducas noticed that the coefficients B of the secret
key and the 1 could be distinguished via machine learning techniques [30], noticing for one part that the non-diagonal coefficients follow an “absolute-circulant”
structure, and the fact that only two types of non-zero values exist. Based on
this information, a surprisingly small amount of selected “features” to specialize
a “least-square fit” method allowed them to recover both positions and signs of
all if not most coefficients B of a secret vector. We note they did not conduct a
exhaustive search on all possible methods according to their paper thus stressing
that their method might not be the best. We did not conduct much research on
the related machine learning techniques therefore we cannot comment much on
this part as of now.
On the second step, the recovered coefficients and their positions and signs
allowed them to apply the Kannan embedding attack on a lattice with the exact
same volume as the original public key but of a much lower dimension than
the original authors of DRS based their security on, by scrapping the known B
noise coefficients. Strictly speaking, using the same notation as in the previous
description of DRS and assuming the diagonal coefficient
is equal to the dimen√
sion, the initial search of a shortest vector of length B 2 Nb + N1 + 1 in a lattice
n
vector of length
of
√ dimension n of determinant n becomes a search of a shortest
N1 + 1 in a lattice of dimension n − Nb of determinant nn . The efficiency of
lattice reduction techniques then affects the evaluation of the security strength
of the original DRS scheme.
Yu and Ducas conducted experiments and validated their claims, reducing
the security of the initial submission of DRS from 128-bits to maybe at most
80-bits, using BKZ-138. The original concept (not the instantiation) from [21],
however, still seems to be safe for now: although it has no security proof, to the

best of our knowledge, no severe weaknesses have been found so far. Furthermore, Yu and Ducas advised of some potential countermeasures to fix DRS, i.e
breaking the structure of the particular instance that was submitted: the deterministic approach of the number of B, 1, being limited to those 2 values (5 if
we consider zeroes and signs), and the “absolute-circulant” structure. They also
pointed that a lack of security proof could be problematic and gave some opinions about how one can potentially find provable security for the DRS scheme.
In the following section, we provide a countermeasure which follows some of
the recommendations given by Yu and Ducas as breaking the secret key noise
structure and giving some statistical heuristic, while still preserving the original
idea given in PKC 2008 [21].

4

New setup

We do not change any algorithm here aside the setup of the secret key: the public
key generation method is left unchanged, along with the signature and verification. Compared to the old scheme, this new version is now determined by less
parameters, which leave 6 of them using the previous DRS: the dimension n, a
random generator seed s, a signature bound D, a max norm for hashed messages
δ, a sparsity parameter ∆ that we always set to one, and R a security parameter
determining the number of multiplication rounds to generate the public key.
We choose random noise among all the possible noises vectors which would
still respect the diagonal dominant property of the secret key. This choice is
following Yu and Ducas’s suggestions on breaking the set of secret coefficients,
the “absolute-circulant” structure of the secret key, and allowing us to provide
statistical evidence.
Although we want to have random noise, we must ensure we can still sign
every message and thus guarantee the diagonal dominant structure of our secret
key. Hence, the set of noise vectors we need to keep are all the vectors v ∈ Zn
that have a taxicab norm of kvk1 ≤ D − 1. Let us call that set Vn .
This new setup will also change the bounds used for the public key, as the
original DRS authors linked several parameters together to ensure computations
stay within 64−bits. However, our paper has a more theoretical approach and
we do not focus on the technical implementations yet, which could be left for
further work.

4.1

Picking the random vectors

We are aiming to build the new noise matrix M , which is a n × n matrix such
that M ∈ Vnn . In that regard, we construct a table we will call T with D entries
such that

T [i] = #vectors v ∈ Vn with i zeroes.
This table is relatively easy to build and does not take much time, one can for
example use the formulas derivated from [24] and [10].
From this table, we construct another table TS such that TS [k] =

Pk

i=0

T [i].

The generation algorithm of the table TS , which we will use as a precomputation for our new setup algorithm can be seen in Alg 5.

Input: - all initial parameters;
Output: - TS the table sum;
// Initialization
m ← min(dimension, diagonal value D);
T ← {1}m+1 ;
TS ← {1}m+1 ;
// Construct array T
// Construct array T : loop over the norm
for j = 2 ; j ≤ D ; j = j + 1 do
// Construct array T : loop over the number of non-zeroes
elements in each possibility
for i = 2 ; i ≤ m+ 1 ; i = i + 1 do
n
j−1
;
x ← 2i−1 i−1
i−2
T [m + 1 − i] ← T [m + 1 − i] + x;
end
end
// Construct array TS from T
for i = 1 ; i ≤ m ; i = i + 1 do
T [i + 1] ← T [i + 1] + T [i];
end
TS ← T ;
return TS ;

Algorithm 5: Secret key table precomputation

Let us denote the function Z(x) → y such that TS [y − 1] < x ≤ TS [y].
Since TS is trivially sorted in increasing order Z(x) is nothing more than a
dichotomy search inside an ordered table.
If we pick randomly x from [0; TS [D − 1]] from a generator with uniform
distribution g() → x then we got Zero() → Z(g(x)) a function that selects
uniformly an amount of zeroes amount all vectors of the set Vn , i.e.
Zero() → #zeroes in a random v ∈ Vn
Now that we can generate uniformly the number of zeroes we have to determine the coefficients of the non-zero values randomly, while making sure the
final noise vector is still part of Vn . A method to give such a vector with chosen

taxicab norm is given in [27] as a correction of the Kraemer algorithm. As we do
not want to choose the taxicab norm M directly but rather wants to have any
random norm available, we add a slight modification: the method in [27] takes
k non-zero elements x1 , ..., xk such that xi ≤ xi+1 and forces the last coefficient
to be equal to the taxicab norm chosen, i.e xk = M . By removing the restriction
and using xk ≤ D, giving the amount of non-zero values, we modify the method
to be able to take over any vector values in Vn with the help of a function we
will call
KraemerBis(z) → random v ∈ Vn
such that v has z zeroes which is described in Alg 6

Input: - all initial parameters;
- a number of zeroes z;
Output: - a vector v with z zeroes and a random norm inferior or equal to D;
// Algorithm start
v ∈ Nn ;
Pick randomly n − z + 1 elements such that 0 ≤ x0 < x1 < ... < xn−z ≤ D;
for i = 1 ; i ≤ n − z ; i = i + 1 do
v[i] ← xi − xi−1 ;
end
for i = n − z + 1 ; i ≤ n ; i = i + 1 do
v[i] ← 0;
end
return v;

Algorithm 6: KraemerBis

With both those new parts, the new setup algorithm we construct is presented in Alg 7 using Kraemer bis. We note that in our algorithm, the diagonal
coefficient in the secret key is not guaranteed to be equal to the bound used
for the maximum norm of the signatures. Nevertheless, we will show that the
termination is still ensured in Sec 4.2. This heavy setup naturally affects the
speed of the DRS setup, as we noticed in our experiments as shown in Sec 4.3.
4.2

A slightly more general termination proof

The proof stated in the DRS report on the NIST website [20] was considering
that the diagonal coefficient of S = d ∗ Id + M stayed equal to the signature
bound, which is not our case. We show here that the reduction is still guaranteed
nevertheless. Suppose that some coefficients of the noise matrix M are non-zero
on the diagonal. Re-using for the most part notations of the original report,
where:
– m is the message we want to reduce, which we update step by step

Input: - all initial parameters;
- another extra random seed x2 ;
Output: - x, S the secret key;
S ← D × Idn ;
t ∈ Zn ;
InitiateRdmSeed(x2 );
for i = 1 ; i ≤ n ; i = i + 1 do
Z ← Zero();
t ← KraemerBis(Z);
for j = 1 ; j ≤ n − Z ; j = j + 1 do
t[j] ← t[j] × RdmSgn()
end
t ← RdmPmtn(t);
S[i] ← S[i] + t;
end
return x, S;

Algorithm 7: New secret key generation (square matrix of dimension n)

– M is the noise matrix (so Mi is the i-th noise row vector).
– d is the signature bound for which the condition kmk∞ < d has to be verified.
We note di the i-th diagonal coefficient of the secret key S.
Obviously, the matrix will still be diagonal dominant in any case. Let us
denote di the diagonal coefficient Si,i of S = D − M .
If d > di we can use the previous reasoning and reduce |mi | to |mi | < di < d,
but keep in mind we stop the reduction at |mi | < d to ensure we do not leak
information about the noise distribution.
Now di > d for some i: reducing to |mi | < di is guaranteed but not sufficient anymore P
as we can reach d < |mi | < di ≤ d + ∆ < 2d. Let us remind
n
that ∆ = d − j=1 |Mi,j |, where ∆ is strictly positive as an initial condition
of the DRS signature scheme (both on the original submission and this paper),
di = d + c where c = |Mi,i |.
Without loss of generality as we can flip signs, let us set mi = d + k < di =
d + c with k ≥ 0 the coefficient to reduce. Substracting by Si transforms
mi ← (d + k) − di = (d + k) − (d + c) = k − c < 0
with d > c > k ≥ 0. Therefore the reduction of kmk1 without the noise is
kmk1 ← kmk1 − (d + k) + (c − k) = kmk1 − (d − c) − 2k.
but the noise contribution on other coefficients is at worst (d − ∆) − c thus
kmk1 ← kmk1 − (d − c) − 2k + (d − c − ∆).
kmk1 ← kmk1 − 2k − ∆ = kmk1 − (2k + ∆).

where 2k + ∆ > 0. Therefore the reduction is also ensured in the case di > d.
4.3

Setup performance

Compared to the initial NIST submission where the code was seemingly made for
clarity and not so much for performance, we wrote our own version of DRS using
NIST specifications and managed to have much higher performance. However,
most of the performance upgrade from the initial code have nothing much to do
with the algorithms of the DRS scheme: we did notice that most of the time taken
by the DRS initial code was used for the conversion from the character arrays
to integer matrices and vice-versa, which they had to do to respect the NIST
specifications: the algebraic computations themselves were actually reasonably
fast, considering the size of the objects manipulated.
This is the reason why we decided to isolate the secret matrix generation
code from the rest of the initial original DRS code, in order to have a fair
comparison between our own secret key generation algorithm to theirs. In that
regard we choose to compare similar matrix sizes instead of similar security, as
initial security estimates for the DRS submission were severely undermined by
Yu and Ducas’s recent discoveries and thus would lead to comparing efficiency
on matrices with massively different sizes. Therefore we are making tests on
the initial parameters of the DRS scheme. Looking purely at the secret key
generation, we are indeed much slower, as shown in Table 1.
Table 1. Secret key generation time in seconds for 104 keys
Dimension
OldDRS
N ewDRS

912

1160

1518

28.71 44.15 79.57
317.45 631.89 993.92

Note that we use the options −march = native and −Of ast which led us
to use AV X512 instructions and other gcc optimization tweaks. The new setup
is barely parallelizable as there is almost no code that can be vectorized which
also explains the huge difference.

5
5.1

Security estimates
BDD-based attack

The security is based on what is known as the currently most efficient way to
attack the scheme, a BDD-based attack as described in Alg 8.
Currently, the most efficient way to perform this attack will be, first, to
transform a BDD problem into a Unique Shortest Vector Problem (uSVP)
(Kannan’s Embedding Technique [9]), assuming v = (0, ...0, d, 0, ..., 0), and use

Input: public key P k of full rank n, diagonal coefficient d, BDDγ solver φ
Output: secret key Sk = (D − M )
Sk ← d ∗ Idn ;
foreach {i ∈ [1..n]} do
r ← φ(L(P k), Sk[i]), Sk[i] ← Sk[i] + r;;
end
return Sk ;

Algorithm 8: Diagonal Dominant Key recovery attack

lattice reduction techniques on the lattice spanned by [v|1] and the rows of [B|0].
By using this method, we obtain a uSVP with a gap

γ≈

Γ

n+3
2

1
 n+1

1

Det(L) n+1
Γ
√
≈
πkM1 k2

n+3
2

1
 n+1

1

dn n+1
√
.
πkM1 k2

(1)

Lattice reduction methods are well studied and their strength are evaluated
using the Hermite factor. Let L a d−dimensional lattice, the Hermite factor
1
of a basis B of L is given by kB[1]k2 /det(L) n . Consequently, lattice reduction
algorithms strengths are given by the Hermite factor of their expected output
basis. In [6], it was estimated that lattice reduction methods solve uSVPγ with
γ a fraction of the Hermite factor. We will use a conservative bound of 14 for the
ratio of the uSVP gap to the Hermite factor. As we do not have a fixed euclidean
norm for our secret vectors we have to rely on the approximates given to us by
our new random method in sampling noise vectors Mi . In our case, we know
√ 1 , and our experiments (as seen
that for any vector v ∈ Zn we have kvk2 ≥ kvk
n
√
√ 1.
below) allow us to use a higher bound kvk2 ' 2 kvk
n
5.2

Expected Security Strength

Different papers are giving some relations between the Hermite factor and the
security parameter λ [22,8] often using BKZ simulation [4]. Aiming to be conservative, we are to assume a security of 2128 , 2192 , 2256 for a Hermite factor of
1.006d , 1.005d , 1.004d , respectively. We set D = n, pick hashed messages h(m)
such that log2 (kh(m)k∞ ) = 28, R = 24 and ∆ = 1.
Table 2. Parameter Sets.
Dimension ∆ R δ
1108
1372
1779

1 24 28 <
1 24 28 <
1 24 28 <

γ
1
(1.006)d+1
4
1
(1.005)d+1
4
1
(1.004)d+1
4

2λ
2128
2192
2256

Table 2 parameters have been choosen to obtain a uSVP gap (Equation 1)
d+1
with γ < δ 4 for δ = 1.006, 1.005, 1.004. Our experiments show us that the
distribution of zeroes among sampled noise vectors form a Gaussian and so does
the euclidean norm of noise vectors when picking our random elements x, xi
6
uniformly. Here we include below the distribution of 10q
randomly generated
noise vectors v with the x-axis representing f (v) = b100
signature bound (see Fig 1).

kvk22
D c

where D is the

Fig. 1. f (v) distribution for n = 1108, 1372, 1779 and D = n − 1 over 106 samples

We can see that the generated noise vectors follow a Gaussian distribution as
far as their norms are concerned, and we believe it makes guessing values much
harder for an attacker should they choose to focus on finding specific values or
vectors (as it was the case in the original attack from Yu and Ducas [30]). We
also conducted experiments, using BKZ20 from the fplll library [28] (see Fig
2). Without any surprise we notice our new setup is seemingly resistant around
dimension 400, where conservative bounds led us to believe the break happen
until approximately dimension 445. However the sample size is relatively small
(yet computationally expensive to obtain) and thus should not be taken as a
proof value, but rather as a heuristic support against heuristic attacks.

6

Conclusion and open questions

We presented in this paper a new method to generate secret keys for the DRS
scheme, providing experimental results on the statistical distribution of the keys
generated. We demonstrate that our new approach is sufficient to improve DRS
to be secure against machine learning attacks as reported earlier in the literature.
However, the secret matrix is still diagonal dominant and it remains an open
question whether there exists a tight security proof to a well-known problem or
if there is any unforeseen weaknesses to diagonal dominant lattices as both Li,
Liu, Nitaj and Pan’s [11] and Yu and Ducas’s attacks [30] could lead to. The
open questions for improvement stated in the original DRS report are also still
applicable to our proposed iteration.
On the technical side, our method to generate random samples is also slow
and might need improvement. It also impacts the setup as mentioned earlier, as

Fig. 2. Percentage of key recoveries of BKZ20 (20 sample keys/dim)
100

80

60

40

20

0
365 370 375 380 385 390 395 400 405
Dimension

keeping the current DRS parameters one can see the possibility to overflow and
go over 64−bits, even though the probability is extremely low, thus changing the
public key generation is also left as an open question. The initial DRS scheme was
very conservative not only on their security but also the manipulated integer size
bounds: one might use heuristics to drastically increase the memory efficiency
of the scheme.
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24. Serra-Sagristà, J.: Enumeration of lattice points in l1 norm. Information processing
letters 76(1-2), 39–44 (2000)
25. Shor, P.W.: Polynomial-time algorithms for prime factorization and discrete logarithms on a quantum computer. SIAM Journal on Computing 26(5) (1997)
26. Sloane, N.J.A.: Encrypting by Random Rotations, pp. 71–128. Springer Berlin
Heidelberg, Berlin, Heidelberg (1983)
27. Smith, N.A., Tromble, R.W.: Sampling uniformly from the unit simplex (2004)
28. The FPLLL team: Fplll, a lattice reduction library, https://github.com/fplll
29. Wei, W., Liu, M., Wang, X.: Finding shortest lattice vectors in the presence of
gaps. In: CT-RSA 2015. pp. 239–257. Springer (2015)
30. Yu, Y., Ducas, L.: Learning strikes again: The case of the drs signature scheme.
In: ASIACRYPT 2018. pp. 525–543. Springer (2018)

